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1 INTRODUCTION  
At least since the controversy over the attempted disposal at sea of the Brent Spar structure 
(see UYSEG 2005 for a simple and objective account of this), the decommissioning of North 
Sea offshore oil and gas installations has been a matter of intense policy concern. It is likely 
that many more North Sea structures will need to be decommissioned in the coming years. 
 
This paper1 assesses and evaluates various options for decommissioning using a 
methodology that combines material flow and energy flow analysis, with assessment of the 
resulting environmental impacts, and value chain analysis. The intention is that this joint 
focus on economic and environmental factors (and social factors where relevant) will enable 
the full implications of the different decommissioning options to be properly compared2. 
 
Section 2 outlines some of the main features of the assessment methodology to be employed. 
Section 3 briefly discusses the decommissioning issues and options considered, while Section 
4 describes how the assessment was carried out. Section 5 gives the outcomes of the 
assessment. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 METHODOLOGY, SCOPE AND SOURCES 
Material and energy flow analysis are based on the fundamental principle that neither energy 
nor matter can be created or destroyed, only changed from one form into another. The 
analysis involves drawing a conceptual boundary around a system and undertaking an 
accounting process for energy and/or material flows through the system or across its 
boundary, balancing inputs, changes in stocks and outputs of a given material, or a flow of 
energy, over a given timeframe. Materials cross the boundary of the system under 
consideration and are transformed by a process. Those that stay within the boundary are 
added to the material stocks of the system. Those that leave the boundary (whether as 
products or wastes) are subtracted from the material stocks of the system. A mass balance 
equation expresses the reality that matter cannot be created or destroyed. 
 
With regard to energy, typically the process under consideration in the system will use high-
grade energy and transform it into low-grade energy which will usually be dissipated across 
the boundary of the system. Like matter, the amount of energy will be conserved but it will 
be changed from a high-grade to a low-grade form. 
 
Industrial processes typically utilise high-grade energy and raw materials to produce a higher 
value product, and one or more low-value waste products, often themselves requiring further 
processing. This further processing (of which decommissioning is an example) itself may 
                                                 
1
 The paper is the result of a project funded under the UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)’s 
Sustainable Technologies Initiative LINK Programme, with funding from the Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), matched by industry, largely through in-kind contributions in identifying 
and providing data, case studies and research papers. This research funding and support is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
2
 The longer Working Paper, Ekins et al. 2005, from which this paper is derived, goes into far more detail on 
many of the issues which informed this assessment than there is space for here. 
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produce low-value wastes and involve environmental impacts. Assessment of such processes 
needs to consider  
 
• The impacts and environmental risks of the waste if left unprocessed; 
• The value and environmental burden of the input materials used in the processes 
and the outputs from it; and 
• The wider social and distributional implications of these outcomes including the 
interests of future generations. 
 
Any perceived net benefit has to be considered in relation to the financial expenditure of the 
processes and the overall benefits they yield. 
 
One aspect to consider in the application of this methodology to decommissioning is that 
there is potential to recycle the materials comprising the structure. In essence, the two broad 
decommissioning options are: 
 
• To return the structure to shore and recycle the materials which comprise it, when the 
material, energy, financial, emission and other implications of dismantling the 
structure, transporting it to shore and recycling it need to be calculated; 
• To leave it in situ, when the analysis needs to include the material, energy and 
financial implications of so doing, plus the implications of producing the same 
amount of useful material as recycling it would have done onshore, Not recovering 
and processing the structure requires that raw material and energy be consumed to 
replace the materials which would have been recycled if the structure had been 
brought onshore.  
 
The financial flows involved in any process consist of the financial costs of undertaking the 
process. There are also various non-financial (social and environmental) issues related to the 
process’s material and energy flows (see Table 2.1). These issues, which will not necessarily 
be included in any way in the financial flows associated with material and energy use, need 
to be addressed explicitly.  The approach taken in this study is not to make a valuation of 
such non-financial outcomes, but to identify and qualitatively assess the importance of them 
relative to some reference case.  
 
 
Table 2.1:  Issues Addressed in this Assessment of Decommissioning 
 
Assessed quantitatively Assessed qualitatively 
Material inputs A clear seabed 
Material endpoints (of the material 
being decommissioned) 
Health and safety of personnel directly involved in the 
decommissioning process 
Total energy requirement (TER) Jobs in the UK 
Total gaseous emissions Impacts on the marine environment 
Financial expenditures Conservation of non-renewable resources 
 Impacts of resource extraction 
 Impacts of landfill 
 Impact on the fishing (specifically trawling) industry 
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 Impacts on fish (and other marine life) 
 
 
In the discussion of these issues that follows in Section 4, any financial considerations related 
to the issues are quantified where possible, while the non-financial components are given 
different symbolic representation. Because of the uncertainties involved in some of the 
financial calculations (which relate to processes some of which have never actually been 
carried out), it would have been desirable to give the financial estimates as ranges. Usually, 
however, this was not possible from the extant sources. It should, therefore, be borne in mind 
that point financial estimates are not intended to suggest accuracy or levels of uncertainty, 
but simply reproduce the numbers in the studies consulted. 
 
As noted by Greenpeace (2004), which of all the environmental groups has taken most 
interest in and exerted most influence on the decommissioning issue, any full consideration 
of decommissioning also needs to take account of broader issues such as “the established 
international trend against dumping”, “the cumulative damage and the potential precedent 
that could be set by dumping individual installations on a ‘case-by-case’ basis”, the need for 
industry to take responsibility for the products it creates, the precautionary principle and the 
need to protect the environment from harm. Some of these issues will be qualitatively 
assessed under the headings above. Others will be brought into consideration in the 
concluding discussion and interpretation of the results of the analysis in Section 5. 
 
The analysis of the selected decommissioning options chosen starts after execution of all the 
required tasks which are common to all decommissioning options (shutdown, well 
decommissioning and flushing and cleaning of tanks, process equipment and pipelines), and 
ends for the in-situ options when monitoring and surveying activities begin (i.e. they are not 
included in the assessment), and after recycling or the transfer of residual waste to a third 
party for the return-to-shore options. No limit is put on the time period over which the 
impacts and outcomes of decommissioning are considered relevant for the analysis. There is 
also no assumption that the impacts of the decommissioning will be confined to the UK or 
the North Sea. Financially the analysis only looks at the expenditures incurred in 
decommissioning and makes no quantitative assessment of the wider economic impacts.  
 
Figures for the energy requirements of decommissioning of offshore structures are produced 
by the Institute of Petroleum (IP 2000). This provides a methodological framework for 
making an assessment of energy use in the absence of case specific figures being available. 
This framework is used as the starting point for this analysis of decommissioning both for 
energy (diesel) and its corresponding material flows. 
 
Decommissioning of offshore structures in the North Sea is in its relative infancy. Relatively 
few structures have so far been decommissioned. No large fixed steel structures have so far 
been decommissioned. It is therefore not surprising that, to date, the great majority of study 
and analysis of the impacts and different options of decommissioning have been carried out 
by the industry. In fact, this study would not have been possible had the industry not given 
access to the project researchers information from industry sources, which had not been 
previously available. Much of this information comes from recent intensive studies relating 
to the decommissioning of a large steel structure, which is here called Case Study A, access 
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to which was obtained on a confidential basis from an operating company, which had carried 
them out as part of the process of preparing the first draft of decommissioning proposals for 
submission to the UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).  
 
Two other bodies of work have provided useful material for this study: 
 
• Studies relating to the decommissioning of Maureen, a steel-based re-floatable platform 
structure. (Phillips UK 1999) 
• Studies relating to the decommissioning of Ecofisk I, a planned 15-year decommissioning 
programme for thirteen steel platform facilities as well a storage tank in the Norwegian 
North Sea. (ConocoPhillips 1999). For ease of reference in some tables, this has 
sometimes been called Case Study B. 
• The Joint Industry Project (JIP), led by the UK Offshore Operators’ Association 
(UKOOA), a major programme of research seeking the best way of tackling the historical 
legacy of accumulated drill cuttings beneath offshore installations in the North Sea 
(UKOOA 2002). 
 
 
3 DECOMMISSIONING ISSUES 
A typical North Sea ‘large steel’ deep-water structure (Watson, 2001, p.27) consists of: 
• A ‘topside’, the actual platform above the surface of the sea on which offshore 
activities take place. 
• A ‘jacket’, which supports the topside and is a structure largely of tubular steel, which 
may be 140-160m high and weight 12,000-30,000 tonnes. 
• ‘Footings’, the lowest and heaviest section of the jacket, which are considered 
separately for decommissioning purposes. The footings include ‘pile clusters’ to aid 
piling of the structure into the seabed, and a drilling template, through which the 
wells are drilled. 
• A pile of ‘drill cuttings’, perhaps 5m high on the seabed beneath the platform, 
consisting of drilled rock particles and drilling fluids arising from drilling the wells. 
In addition, there are likely to be pipelines for the export of oil and gas, which may also need 
to be decommissioned. 
 
3.1  REGULATORY AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 
The regulatory framework for the decommissioning of offshore structures in the North Sea is 
provided by the OSPAR convention. There is currently a presumption under the OSPAR 
convention that all offshore structures will be entirely brought to shore for decommissioning, 
with only limited possibilities for derogation. In particular, OSPAR Decision 98/3 (taken in 
1998) requires the following:  
 
• All topsides of all structures are to be removed and brought to shore for reuse, recycling 
or disposal; 
• All sub-structures or jackets weighing less than 10,000 tonnes must be totally 
removed and brought to shore for re-use, recycling or disposal; 
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• For sub-structures weighing over 10,000 tonnes, there is a presumption to remove 
totally but with the potential of a derogation being agreed on whether the footings might 
be left in place; and 
• Derogation may be considered for the heavy concrete gravity based structures as well 
as for floating concrete installations and any concrete anchor-base. 
 
At the UK level decommissioning is regulated by the DTI. The DTI’s Guidance Notes for the 
decommissioning of offshore facilities and pipelines detail how all components of the 
decommissioning process should be dealt with including drill cutting piles and pipelines 
(DTI 2001). Any OSPAR derogation requires formal international consultation to be 
undertaken by the relevant government.  
 
The cost of decommissioning all of the structures associated with the UKCS was estimated in 
2004 as £9.1 billion by 2030 (UKOOA 2004, p.10). Watson (2001, p.6) estimates that the 
costs of total removal of the North Sea structures (i.e. also including Norwegian and Dutch 
structures) may be £13-£20 billion. This illustrates both the high costs and continuing 
economic uncertainties associated with decommissioning, especially of the large steel 
structures in deep water, of which there is as yet no experience. Moreover, while the 
structures may be similar, they are not identical, and differences in detailed design, coupled 
with differences in the nature and extent of wear and tear over their lifetimes in the harsh 
North Sea environment, mean that the decommissioning of each one will need to be 
approached on a fresh basis.  
 
Because the tax regime applied to offshore oil and gas operators in the UK sector of the 
North Sea allows decommissioning expenditures to be offset against tax liability in the 
normal way, some proportion of the costs can be regarded as effectively public expenditure, 
because of the tax revenues foregone. This is an important, but little appreciated, 
distributional implication of decommissioning, which makes decommissioning relevant to 
public as well as private spending priorities. Tax relief means that the UK governmental 
contribution to decommissioning offshore structures will be between 30-70% depending on 
historical levels of Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) paid. Based on present cost estimates, the 
cost to the taxpayer of decommissioning all of the structures on the UKCS associated with oil 
and gas is estimated to be £4.6 billion in the years 2001-2030 (Kemp et al. 2001, p.31, 
medium exploration scenario), about 50% of the total cost, and this is the proportion assumed 
in the rest of this paper. Assessment of the wider fiscal implications of the decommissioning 
options (for example, considering the sources of alternative tax revenues required due to tax 
offsets) is beyond the scope of the paper. 
 
All those with a financial interest in an oil and gas installation have a residual liability for 
anything left in-situ.  In the event of the ownership being passed on, perhaps to new entrants 
and smaller operators (DTI 2001, p.34), new owners may be asked to give financial security 
to old owners, because, in the event of new owners going out of business, liability can revert 
to former owners. If a party wishes to end their liabilities in the asset, this will only be agreed 
to by the Government if appropriate external financial security is agreed within the 
partnership  (DTI 2001, Annex F). In addition to formal legal liability, residual materials may 
be a potential liability in terms of reputation, for a certain time and for the larger oil 
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companies at least. Any residual liability following decommissioning is noted in the 
assessment but has not been quantified. 
 
3.2 DECOMMISSIONING EXPERIENCE AND OPTIONS 
A number of structures of various types have either been decommissioned or have been 
approved for decommissioning. These include:  
 
• Brent Spar –A steel floating storage facility (dismantled onshore); 
• Maureen – A steel-based re-floatable platform structure (dismantled onshore); 
• Ekofisk I – A planned 15-year decommissioning programme for thirteen steel platform 
facilities as well as a storage tank (platforms removed to shore, tank to be left in situ); 
• Case Study A – A large steel structure such as that described above (none yet 
decommissioned). 
 
On the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) there are 33 large fixed steel structures (DTI 2002, 
Annex 2A, p.44). Many of these structures will be eligible for derogation under the current 
OSPAR arrangements and could apply to leave their footings in-situ. While it is not possible 
to say that the Case Study A structure is in detail representative of all large steel structures, 
because all have some unique aspects, it is a structure roughly in the middle of the range of 
weight and water depth for such structures, and does not seem to have any features that 
would systematically bias the analysis. It has therefore been treated in this paper as broadly 
representative of large steel structures as a whole, but the results and conclusions should be 
interpreted with this in mind.  
 
The decommissioning options assessed in this paper relate to: 
 
1. Large steel production platforms which are fixed to the seabed with jackets of greater 
than 10,000 tonnes (based on a case study of a structure in the middle of the size 
range of such structures) and which may contain materials set out as in Table 3.1; 
2. Large mostly concrete structures (based on a tank case study); 
3. Pipelines, based on a case study of a combined oil and a gas pipeline. These pipelines 
do not represent the larger trunk oil pipelines used for the export of oil from a number 
of facilities; 
4. Large drill cuttings piles of about 40,000 tonnes, some of which contain oil-based 
drilling muds. 
 
 
Table 3.1 Materials Contained in a Mid-Size Large Steel Structure1 
 
  Totals Steel Aluminium Copper Non-metals 
  
t t t T t 
Topside 20,520 20,000 20 200 300 
Jacket 10,200 9,000 500   700 
Footings 11,300 10,000 300   1,000 
Total structure 42,020 39,000 820 200 2,000 
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1
 It should be noted that the tonnages of materials in such structures will vary and these figures should be 
regarded as no more than indicative of the kinds of masses involved. 
 
The three decommissioning possibilities assessed in more detail below are as follows: 
 
• Leave in situ – Leaving the structure in situ after the cleaning of all hydrocarbons. 
While leaving individual component parts of the structure (e.g. topside, jacket etc.) 
can be considered separately, obviously lower components have to be left in situ for 
this to be considered for a higher component.  
• Shallow disposal – Dismantling the structure and depositing it onto the seabed 
around the site of the operational structure. 
• Recovery – The removal and transport to shore, and dismantling and re-processing or 
landfilling, of all the components of the structure. 
 
There are a number of other decommissioning possibilities, summarised below. Apart from 
not being legal under current regulations, as discussed above, they have not been analysed 
further, or separately, in this paper for the reasons given: 
• Monitoring – Leaving the structure in situ with a programme of on-going monitoring 
of the fate of the abandoned structure and associated materials (e.g. pipelines and drill 
cuttings piles). This possibility is only potentially available for footings over 10,000 
tonnes, drill cuttings and pipelines. In fact, appropriate monitoring will need to be 
carried out for any materials left in situ. It has therefore been considered in the 
discussion of the options that envisage this, rather than as a separate option. 
• Toppling – Doing the minimum required to topple the structure so that it simply lays 
on its side at the site. There has been no or very little work done on this option 
relevant to the larger steel structures mainly analysed in this report. If it was 
discovered to be a technically feasible option for fixed steel structures, toppling 
would have many similarities to the shallow disposal option but with moderately 
lower material, energy and financial requirements.  
• Deep-sea disposal – Removing the structure for disposal in the deep ocean, where it 
would be effectively impossible for there to be any further human interaction with the 
material comprising it. There has been little work done on this option since the 
OSPAR regulations made it effectively illegal, making it rather difficult to provide 
accurate analysis of its cost and material basis. In any case, deep-sea disposal seems 
likely to have a significantly greater total energy requirement than shallow disposal 
(ERT 1997, p.11, Table 4), without having additional benefits, and it is therefore 
excluded from further analysis on these grounds.  
 
Table 3.2 presents an overview of the various decommissioning options considered later in 
this paper. For all of them, the assessment does not include the basic activities – clean up (of 
hydrocarbons from the structure’s oil and gas systems), well decommissioning and the 
clearing of debris from the immediate surface of the seabed (i.e. not including the drill 
cuttings pile) – that are common to all of them. The ‘Leave in situ’ options for the structure 
(T1, J1, F1, CON1) assume that nothing else is done beyond these activities. Options T2, J2 
involve shallow disposal of the structure. T3, J3, F2, and CON2 entail recovery of the 
structure and its removal to shore for reprocessing or disposal of its constituent materials. 
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Option F2 (recovery of footings) has two possible variants (F2a & F2b) depending on 
whether  
• F2a: the drill cuttings are left in place  
• F2b: the drill cuttings are removed.  
This is important as the removal of the footings with the drill cuttings left in situ could 
disrupt the drill cuttings with resulting release of hydrocarbons into the water column. This 
difference will be apparent in the description of the approach to drill cuttings rather than in 
the description of F2 itself. ‘Hybrid’ options would be to cut the footings at the level of the 
drill cuttings, which then might or might not be covered; or to dredge (using a suction 
dredge) only those cuttings round the footings, so that the footings could then be removed. 
The dredged cuttings could then be disposed of as discussed below, and the rest left 
undisturbed, or covered, as desired. Because of lack of data, these options have not been 
explored in detail, but they will be considered in the relevant place in the conclusions. 
 
 
Table 3.2 Summary of Decommissioning Options 
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Topside T1 T2 T3                 
Jacket J1 J2 J3                 Large 
fixed steel Footings F1   F2(a, b)                 
Concrete Tank CON 1   CON 2         
Pipelines P1   P2 P3 P4             
Drill Cuttings C1         C2 C3     C4 
Note: Only unshaded boxes contain options that are considered in detail below, for reasons that are given in 
the text 
 
Pipelines may be left in situ (P1), recovered and removed to shore (P2), subjected to 
‘remedial action’ (P3), which entails carrying out additional activities (which might include a 
combination of: mechanical trenching, burying with sand or rock, or removal and recovery of 
selected lengths of pipelines) to ensure long-term integrity of the pipelines (Case Study A, 
ENV 02, p.16) or buried (P4). These options are all described in more detail in Section 4.  
 
With regard to drill cuttings, these may be left in situ (C1), covered (C3, with or without the 
lowest part of the footings left in situ, as noted above) or removed and treated onshore (C4). 
One further possible process for their removal is referred to as ‘excavation’. This entails 
subjecting the drill cuttings pile to a low velocity, high volume flow of water which raises it 
into suspension. Re-suspended material is dispersed into the surrounding water and carried 
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from the site with the prevailing current or tide and redeposited over a much larger area. 
Following excavation, the site of the pile may be left (C2) or an attempt could be made to 
cover the much larger area over which the cuttings have been deposited. However, this latter 
option is not further considered here, because it would require an impracticable volume of 
sand and gravel (estimated to be more than 8 million tonnes of sand and gravel combined). 
Other options for drill cuttings are their re-injection into a well, at the same or a different site. 
Some information on the re-injection of cuttings is presented below, but it is not one of the 
options analysed in detail in this report, because it was not assessed in relation to Case Study 
A and the available data relating to it is therefore not comparable to the data that has been 
used for the other options. However, it will be assessed more generally as an option where 
appropriate. 
 
T1,2 and J1,2 are not currently permitted under the OSPAR regulatory framework. They are 
therefore at present only theoretical, rather than available, options for the North Sea and the 
rest of the OSPAR area. To avoid misunderstanding, therefore, in the rest of this paper the 
various decommissioning approaches to be analysed will be called ‘scenarios’ rather than 
options. 
  
3.3 SPECIFIC ISSUES RELATED TO PIPELINES AND DRILL CUTTINGS 
3.3.1 Pipelines 
 
At present the decommissioning of pipelines is not regulated by the OSPAR Convention. The 
decommissioning of pipelines is considered case by case based on comparative assessments 
of all scenarios. 
 
Important issues when assessing the decommissioning scenarios for oil and gas pipelines are 
whether the pipeline is presently trenched or covered, and if so, the status of the coverings 
and the prospects of the pipelines being uncovered in the future. This is important as exposed 
pipelines (in addition to other objects on the seabed) can pose a risk to trawling operations. If 
recovery of pipelines is desired, for smaller pipelines this can be effected relatively easily by 
reeling them in (AURIS 1995, page 5.12). For less flexible pipelines, they may be cut and 
made buoyant and towed to shore, or cut and lifted onto a vessel (AURIS 1995, page 5.12). 
 
The material, energy and value assessment of decommissioning pipelines is similar in form 
to the assessment of the decommissioning of main structures. The key difference is that the 
in-situ scenario may have significant material demands, if the pipeline is to be covered with 
rocks (scenario P3). A 36” pipeline would need to covered by 0.5 metres of rocks, which 
would require a pile 3 metres either side and therefore an estimated 4,000 m3 of material per 
kilometre (AURIS 1995, page 5.14). A further consideration is the relatively dispersed nature 
of pipelines, and whether the material, energy and value benefits of recovering such 
dispersed material justifies the material, energy and financial cost associated with such 
recovery. No energy analysis of the decommissioning of pipelines can be found in the 
literature. 
 
3.3.2 Drill Cuttings 
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Drill cuttings piles are created by solid waste discharges onto the seabed during well-drilling 
operations. Historically, the drilling muds used in the drilling process were oil based and 
therefore the cuttings have hydrocarbon contamination, as well as often containing traces of 
heavy metals, PCBs and radioactive material from the bed and cap rock. 
 
There are an estimated 1.3 million cubic metres of cuttings piles in the North Sea as a whole 
(Wills 2000, page 59, par 1). Gerrard et al. (1999, p.8) estimate that “the total inventory of 
hydrocarbons in cuttings piles is similar to the annual input into the North Sea from all 
sources”. It is estimated that the oil in the 6 largest oil-based mud piles represents 24% of the 
total mass of oil in piles in the UK. The cuttings piles are highly heterogeneous both in shape 
and content.  
 
The fate of cuttings piles is not currently regulated under OSPAR but is addressed by DTI 
guidelines on decommissioning. Research into the decommissioning of drill cuttings piles 
includes a research programme commissioned by UKOOA (UKOOA 2002), which carried 
out a number of case studies, the most significant of which were around the North West 
Hutton, Beryl A and Ekofisk 2/4A structures. Gerrard et al. (1999) also investigated as a case 
study the North West Hutton pile, which, with a volume of 25,225m3 and a mass of 42,126 
tonnes, is one of the larger piles. 
 
The independent Scientific Review Group (SRG) for the UKOOA (2002) study described its 
findings thus: “The results indicate that the present effects of existing piles are highly 
localised, and the spatial extent of the areas affected is a small percentage of the total. The 
total quantities of hydrocarbons in the piles are substantial (about 150,000 tonnes), but these 
are largely immobilised and are only being removed very slowly by erosion, degradation and 
leaching (over several or many decades). The rate of release to the wider environment is 
therefore small in relation to the amount of hydrocarbons from other sources (e.g. rivers).” 
(SRG 2002, p.8) 
 
The key findings of the UKOOA (2002) study in relation to water column and food chain 
impacts were broadly reassuring, finding that none of the concentrations of potentially toxic 
substances (including PAHs metals, endocrine disruptors and NORM [Naturally Occurring 
Radioactive Material]) appeared likely to result in an adverse effect on biota. However, the 
SRG for the UKOOA (2002) study was not uncritical of the way this part of the study had 
been carried out. It considered that “further longer term and/or in situ experiments will be 
required to resolve the [issue of food chain contamination] satisfactorily” (SRG 2002, p.9).  
 
There is a potentially problematic interaction between the decommissioning of footings and 
the cuttings piles which surround them: 
• If it were decided to remove the cuttings piles, this would be technically feasible 
whether or not the footings were being removed. 
• The footings could be accessed and removed by only removing the cuttings 
immediately around them, thereby avoiding considerable disturbance of the 
cuttings. 
• It would be possible to cut the footings at the level of the cuttings pile, leaving the 
residual footing in the cuttings pile, which might or might not then be covered, 
and removing the rest of the footings to shore. 
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These issues are considered in more detail in the decommissioning assessments. 
 
The four main decommissioning scenarios considered by UKOOA (2002) were: dredging of 
the cuttings with offshore processing; dredging of the cuttings with onshore processing; 
leaving in-situ with monitoring, either with or without covering. The report contained a huge 
amount of technical detail, which there is no space even to summarise here (some is 
contained in Ekins et al. 2005), but which has informed the assessment in Section 4 where 
relevant. 
 
The favoured technology for dredging is suction dredging, for which there is little evidence 
of pollution of the water column beyond the ‘immediate plume’, and no discernible impact at 
a distance of 100m (UKOOA 2002, Final report, Q.48 p.20). Offshore processing of the 
resulting slurry may be carried out through re-injection into an existing well or 
bioremediation. Gerrard et al. (1999. p.10) found re-injection to have the lowest 
environmental impacts of any disposal scenario, but acknowledged that on a large scale it 
might be slow, and suffer from logistical difficulties. It might also increase energy use and 
atmospheric emissions. There are also doubts about the practicality of bioremediation on a 
large scale (Gerrard et al. 1999, p.9). Moreover, this is a very costly scenario and requires 
nearly 20 times as much energy as the next most energy intensive scenario, which is onshore 
treatment of the cuttings (UKOOA 2002). Both re-injection and offshore bioremediation 
therefore face serious practical constraints at the present time, and are not considered further 
here. 
 
Onshore disposal consists either of the landfilling of solids with minimal processing, or more 
thorough processing to remove the oil and then either landfilling or using the material as a 
low-grade construction aggregate. Landfilling offers the cheapest and simplest of the onshore 
strategies both in terms of energy and cost, but may in the near future be much constrained 
by the EU Landfill Directive (UKOOA 2002, Task 7, p.25). UKOOA (2002, p.57) concluded 
that, of the onshore disposal strategies, only landfilling after thorough processing was 
currently considered a viable option for the future.  
 
If left in situ, the cuttings piles may be covered (with an initial layer of sand followed by a 
gravel filter layer and an outer protective layer of armour stone) to impede leaching of toxic 
material in the piles. The industry believes this to be a low-risk strategy which could be 
achieved by developing proven methods of construction and with little or no adverse impact 
on the marine environment (UKOOA 2002, Task 5b, p.13.5). If left uncovered, according to 
the Independent Research Group (IRG) reviewing and commenting on the studies of this 
scenario undertaken for Case Study A, processes of natural recovery at the pile would be 
slow and confined to small areas, so that the pile area should be considered as being 
environmentally damaged for the foreseeable future, but that there was no reason to regard 
this as a significant threat to the wider environment. (IRG 2004, p.9). 
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4 ASSESSING THE DECOMMISSIONING SCENARIOS 
4.1 THE REFERENCE SCENARIO 
To ensure a sound comparison of the different decommissioning scenarios, it is necessary to 
compare them with a common reference scenario. The reference scenario chosen for this 
study is the starting point from which any decommissioning takes place i.e. the structure 
(comprising the topside, jacket and footings), pipelines and drill cuttings (see T1, J1, F1, 
CON1, P1, C1 in Table 3.2) have only had a basic clean-up and clearance of the surrounding 
area. The structure, pipelines and drill cuttings themselves are ‘left in situ’, with no further 
monitoring or maintenance, and this is how the term ‘leave in situ’ should be understood in 
what follows. All the other scenarios that leave material in situ would also require this 
material to be monitored (and occasional remedial action), but because of uncertainties as to 
what this would entail this has not been estimated here in detail. The cost should be 
considered as part of the residual financial liability incurred in ‘leave in situ’ scenarios. 
 
T1 and J1 are currently against the OSPAR convention and therefore are not being 
contemplated in practice. Their implications have therefore not been studied in any detail and 
they are not further considered here. F1 (with the topside and jacket having been removed to 
the regulated extent), although requiring derogation under OSPAR, clearly is a practicable 
option, as are CON1, P1 and C1. They are therefore considered in some detail below.  
 
4.2 THE FINANCIAL FLOWS 
The financial expenditures required to recover and process a large steel structure considered 
in this paper are based on early estimates of decommissioning expenditures made for Case 
Study A. The proportion of the total costs to be allocated to the removal (as opposed to the 
transport and demolition) of the topside (50%) and jacket (74%) were taken from the 
experience with the (different) Ekofisk structure (ConocoPhillips 1999). This leads to the 
estimate, for example, (see Table 4.1) that the shallow disposal of the topside is assumed to 
cost 50% (£19m) of the total recovery costs (£37m). Despite uncertainties it was not possible 
to present the numbers as a range, as would have been desirable, and the numbers have been 
cited as given in the source. This should not be taken to imply that they are either certain or 
precise. 
 
Table 4.1 shows that, compared to the reference scenario, the total costs of recovering and 
recycling a large steel structure are estimated to be £98m. The cost of the shallow disposal of 
such a structure would be £42m. The potential savings have to be considered with reference 
to the value of the recoverable material, as well as any wider benefits derived from recycling 
the structure. The financial expenditure involved in recovering a large concrete tank is 
estimated to be £310 million at 2003 prices.  
 
The financial expenditures involved in removing the pipelines relating to the large steel 
structure of Case Study A are a little over £15m, for 26 km of pipelines (there is a total of 
9,400 km of pipelines in the North Sea area [DTI 1999, Appendix 11]). The financial 
expenditures to manage the drill cuttings under the large steel structure of Case Study A 
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range from zero to leave the cuttings in situ, to £39m to recover, process and landfill the 
cuttings onshore. This compares to the JIP estimate of £60m (UKOOA 2002, p.23, question 
65), based on a per tonne cost estimate of £1,500. The drill cuttings pile investigated in Case 
Study A was large at 40,000 tonnes and therefore the £39m estimate deriving from this case 
study would suggest either the use of cheaper removal techniques, or considerable economies 
of scale. 
 
Table 4.1 Summary of Financial Expenditures [£2003, million] 
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Topside £191 £37               
Jacket £231 £31               
Footings £0.22 £30               
Large fixed steel 
Total £42 £98               
Concrete Tank   £3103             
Pipelines Pipelines   £15.2 £1.8 £2.5           
Drill Cuttings ~40,000 t 
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        £54 £10.2   £39 
Notes:  
1
 As noted in relation to Table 2.4, the shallow disposal of topsides and jackets is not permitted under the OSPAR 
Convention 
2
 Shallow disposal of footings is not further considered here. It is assumed that the footings would be left in situ in a shallow 
disposal decommissioning scenario. 
3
 The financial expenditure to reprocess the Ekofisk Tank was estimated to be 3,400 million 1998 Norwegian Kroner 
respectively (ConocoPhillips 1999, p.137). This was converted into 1998 sterling (@12.50, Norges Bank) and then by use of 
a UK GDP 1998Q1 – 2003Q1 deflator factor of 114% (ONS) the value of 1998 Kroner can be given in terms of 2003 
sterling. This yields an overall conversion factor of 2003£0.0912 per 1998Kr. 
4
 The financial expenditures for the ‘excavate and leave’ drill cuttings scenario is based on a ship day rate of £38,000 + the 
cost of aggregates. 
 
4.3 THE MATERIAL AND ENERGY FLOWS 
The flow and endpoints of the materials being decommissioned determine the: 
 
1. Overall cost of the decommissioning process; 
2. Input materials and energy (and associated emissions), and the values of these, 
required in the decommissioning process; and 
3. Material processing requirements, and therefore the corresponding energy, emission 
and value implications of the onshore processes. 
 
The rates of material recovery are derived from the study of Ekofisk (Case Study B). This 
comprises 13 smaller production platforms which do not have fixed footings like the large 
steel platforms which are the main focus of analysis here. However, the materials in the 
footings of large steel structures are of similar composition to those found in the jacket. 
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Therefore the rates of material recovery (for each metal type) found for the jackets of Case 
Study B have been applied to both the jacket and the footings of large steel structures. 
 
The decommissioning of the Ekofisk series of platforms achieved 100% recovery of steel, 
aluminium, copper and ballast (aggregates). Overall 85% of both plastics and concrete was 
also recovered. Of electrical materials (such as electrical articles, instruments, cables and 
telecom equipment) in the topside, only 10% was recovered. No asbestos or marine growth 
were recovered. In total, 92% of the total material flow was recovered (ConocoPhillips 1999, 
various tables).  
 
These rates of recovery were then applied for the different materials involved in Case Study 
A, for the two main decommissioning scenarios, Leave in situ and Recovery. In the former 
case, the material that would have been recovered has to be replaced from other sources. Of 
the structure of Case Study A 42,500 tonnes (94%) is steel, which can be recycled if the 
structure is returned to shore. In contrast, if the 40,000 tonnes of cuttings are returned to 
shore, they all need to be landfilled. Ekins et al. (2005) gives the various estimates, from 
various sources including IP 2000, of energy and emission factors, and the market values of 
energy and materials, which have been used in the detailed assessment below. A report by 
Environment and Technology Ltd. (ERT 1997) using IP figures estimated that the total 
energy required for the decommissioning scenarios only differed by 14% between them 
(ERT 1997, p.10).  
 
To facilitate the comparison between the scenarios, Table 4.2 sets out a symbolic scheme for 
the relative energy use and emissions (P), and the rate of materials recovery, for the different 
decommissioning scenarios (compared to the reference scenario). For relative energy use and 
emissions, a proportion P greater than 167% of the reference scenario scores - - -, and a P 
less than 33% scores + + +, with different scores in between as set out in the table. For the 
rate of materials recovery (RR), this is the proportion of the structure as currently standing 
which is usefully recovered (i.e. recycled), rather than left in situ or landfilled. A rate of 
recovery (RR) of more than 85% scores + + +, while one of less than 0.5% scores - - -, with 
different scores in between as set out in the table. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Symbolic Scheme for Relative Energy Use and Emissions, and the Rate of 
Materials Recovery, for the Decommissioning Scenarios 
 
Relative energy use (TER) 
and emissions 
 
 
Assessment of the proportion of energy use and emissions in a scenario (P), compared to the 
reference scenario where: 
P ≥ 167% - - - 
134% ≤ P ≤ 166% - - 
101% ≤P ≤133% - 
P = 100% = 
67% ≤P ≤ 99% + 
34% ≤ P ≤ 66% + + 
P ≤ 33% +++ 
Rate of recovery of 
materials from present  
structure 
 
Assessment of the rate of recovery (RR) of materials from the structure as currently standing 
(i.e. including any marine growth etc.) where: 
RR ≥ 85% +++ 
75% ≤ RR ≤ 85% ++ 
51% ≤ RR ≤ 74% + 
RR = 50% = 
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25% ≤ RR ≤49% - 
0.5% ≤ RR ≤ 24% - - 
RR ≤0.5% - - - 
 
 
4.4 ASSESSMENT SCHEME FOR NON-FINANCIAL OUTCOMES 
As noted in Section 2, there are a number of outcomes from the decommissioning process 
which are not fully captured by the flow of materials and energy, and the corresponding 
financial flows. This section defines and explains the methods used to assess each of these 
non-financial outcomes in turn, and describes how the outcome is assessed in relation to the 
different decommissioning scenarios. Again, where relevant a symbolic scoring system as 
been used, ranging from +++ for a very positive impact to - - - for a very negative impact. 
 
4.4.1 Clear seabed 
 
There may be value in achieving a clear seabed, which goes beyond the financial 
implications or the use value of a cleared seabed. The value arises from a desire for a marine 
environment unmarked by industrial activities, although the achievement of this desire is 
problematic because the marine environment has been affected for many years by industrial 
activities apart from oil and gas extraction, including shipping, marine aggregates extraction, 
trawling and onshore discharges of chemicals. This means that even if the seabed were to 
cleared of materials relating to the operations of the offshore oil and gas industry, it would 
still be very far from being in a condition that was unaffected by human activities.  
 
The assessment identifies three possible states of the seabed following decommissioning: 
1. Clear of all oil-and-gas related material Clear 
2. Any oil-and-gas related material is out of sight and inaccessible Covered 
3. Oil-and-gas related material is exposed in the marine environment Not clear 
 
The reference scenario (T1, J1, F1, P1, C1) obviously does not leave a clear seabed. The 
shallow disposal of any part of the structure (T2, J2) also does not leave a clear seabed. The 
removal of the structure to shore (T3, J3, F2a,b) would leave a clear seabed as far as the 
structure was concerned. For the pipelines and cuttings, a clear seabed would only be 
achieved by their removal to shore (P2, C2). The same is true for a concrete structure 
(CON2). Clearing the seabed of structures, pipelines and drill cuttings would require 
financial expenditures and might give rise to environmental impacts, such as extra energy use 
and air emissions, disruption to the seabed, removal of structures that were providing habitats 
to organisms (such as cold-water coral), or opening up to trawling areas currently protected 
by exclusion zones. These issues are relevant to the desirability of a ‘clear seabed’, although 
their relative importance will differ for different stakeholders. A ‘clear seabed’ assessment 
for a scenario does not therefore necessarily imply that the scenario has delivered net 
environmental benefits. 
 
4.4.2 Health and safety 
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The decommissioning of offshore structures poses significant health and safety challenges, 
even for an industry accustomed to managing high-risk offshore operations. Estimates are 
made on the statistical probability of serious and fatal accidents occurring during the 
decommissioning process. For example, the Ekofisk I planning process estimated that the 
Potential Loss of Life (PLL) of decommissioning the structure (all 13 jackets and the tank) 
was 8% (i.e. there was an 8% probability of a fatal accident) for the largely in-situ option, 
and 29% for the total removal decommissioning option (ConocoPhillips 1999, p.19).  
 
The standard approach to industrial risk management, as set out for example in reports from 
the Health and Safety Executive (e.g. HSE 2001) and further explored in relation to the oil 
and gas sector in UKOOA (1999), is tolerant of the exposure of workers to low-level risks 
over long periods. Such risks tend to be considered a normal outcome of industrial activity. 
Far greater efforts are taken to avoid high-level, short-term risks. It is for this reason that the 
assessment of this issue here has put an emphasis on the two relatively high-risk activities 
associated with decommissioning scenarios that seek to return structures and associated 
materials to shore, which have been assessed as follows:  
• Raising of large structures  - - 
• Divers cutting at depth  - - - 
 
4.4.3 Jobs in the UK 
 
Clearly the more expensive scenarios would provide more direct employment. Some of this 
employment could be in the UK, and, if it were in areas currently affected by unemployment, 
it could make a significant impact on economic and social conditions in those areas. 
 
However, the assessment of the total net impact on jobs in the UK is complex. The key issues 
involved are the degree to which the decommissioning contracts would be captured by UK 
companies; the degree to which the material processing would be carried out in the UK; and 
the degree to which any money not spent on decommissioning would stimulate economic 
activity and therefore jobs elsewhere in the economy.  
 
An overall assessment of the proportion of employment captured within Norway by the 
decommissioning of the entire Ekofisk field (ConocoPhillips 1999) estimated that Norway 
would capture between 36% and 52% of expenditure if all structures were returned to shore 
and recycled. In broad terms, the UK and Norway are comparable in respect of this issue, as 
they are an approximately equal distance from many of the structures and have a similar-
sized oil and gas infrastructure. However, such an estimate does not represent the more 
complex assessment of issues related to the net impact on employment as outlined above, 
which have not been assessed here.  
 
4.4.4 Impacts on the marine environment 
 
Following clean-up, the mere presence of a structure in the sea should not cause significant 
negative impacts on the marine environment.   
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Operations to recover or monitor offshore structures will have some impacts on the marine 
environment, though impacts from monitoring are likely to be very small and are not 
considered further. Other pollution impacts are assessed according to the following scheme.  
 
• Involves additional minor or short-term impacts  
 or disruption of the marine environment  - 
 (examples are concentrations of marine vessels under anchorage and  
 working, and impacts from covering or suction dredging cuttings piles) 
• Involves continued sterility of seabed occupied by cuttings piles, or  
 localised disruption of ecosystems, larger fish or marine mammals but 
 not major or long-term physical damage   - - 
 (examples include leaving uncovered cuttings piles in situ, and any  
 significant underwater activity or disruption of the seabed or loss of  
 corals on decommissioned structures) 
• Involves significant impacts on large marine organisms or ecosystems,  
 in extent or duration  - - - 
 (examples include extensive disruption of cuttings piles or the use of  
 explosives underwater) 
 
In respect of the reference scenario, in the normal course of events, and with the exception of 
the drill cuttings piles, the impacts on the marine environment of leaving material offshore 
will be small. The cuttings piles would render the relevant area of the seabed sterile for many 
centuries, but would very gradually biodegrade, and some material would leach out into the 
environment. The overall impact of this is assessed as medium (‘- -‘).  
 
All the other decommissioning scenarios (for the structure and pipelines) cause a greater 
impact on the marine environment than the reference scenarios, because: 
• The shallow disposal of the topside (T2) and jacket (J2) would disturb the cuttings 
pile. Their removal would give rise to localised disturbances to the environment and 
the loss of corals on the decommissioned structures (‘- -‘). 
• The removal of the footings with the cuttings in situ (F2a) could scatter up to 100% of 
the cuttings over a wide area, with an impact assessed as ‘- - -‘. The impacts would be 
less, and the same as for the jacket (‘- -‘), if the cuttings were removed with the 
footings (F2b). 
• For the pipelines all the non-reference scenarios involve some damage to the marine 
environment, but it is localised and not long term (‘- -‘). 
 
For the drill cuttings, covering them (C3) would encourage the re-establishment of a healthy 
seabed community, with only short-term environmental disturbance, and is therefore assessed 
as ‘-‘, or positive (‘+’) compared to the reference scenario. Removing the cuttings (C4) with 
a suction dredge would also only cause short-term impacts, and is also assessed as ‘-‘, or 
positive (‘+’) compared to the reference scenario. The excavation scenario (C2) involves 
significant environmental damage, possibly resulting in a surface oil slick, with an impact on 
seabirds and sea mammals, and the smothering of benthic organisms over a wide area. To 
reflect this, C2 is assessed as ‘- - -‘, or ‘- (- -)’ compared to the reference scenario. 
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4.4.5 Conservation of stocks of non-renewable resources 
 
With typically 90% by large steel structures consisting of steel, much of them could be 
recycled if returned to shore. Any of this material left in situ (and therefore not recovered) 
would have to be replaced by the extraction and processing of raw material; in the case of 
steel this is mostly iron ore and coal. Iron is one of the commonest metals in the Earth’s 
crust. Of far more potential concern in respect of sustainable development is the availability, 
price and carbon content of the energy that is required to extract and process it.  
 
The loss of non-renewable resources in a decommissioning scenario may be expressed in 
terms of a ‘resource stock ratio’ (RSR) of the (useful) material recovered in a scenario, less 
the mass of fuel required to recover it, to the initial mass of material: 
 
  RSR = 
 
The RSR would therefore be 100% if all the material being considered in a scenario were to 
be recovered without the need for any fuel use. 
 
Assessment of the resource stock ratio (RSR), the recovered useful material, less the input 
fuel use, as a percentage of the total material in the structure where: 
 
RSR  ≥ 67% + + + 66% ≥ RSR ≥ 34% + + 33% ≥ RSR ≥ 1% + 
RSR = 0% = 
-1% ≥ RSR ≥ -33% - -34% ≥ RSR ≥ -66% - - -67% ≥ RSR - - - 
 
(The negative percentages will apply to those scenarios (e.g. return of drill cuttings to shore 
for landfilling) which use a mass of input fuel which is greater than the mass of useful 
material they recover.)  
 
4.4.6 Impacts of resource extraction 
 
The environmental impact associated with the extraction of material resources varies 
depending on the material and the method of extraction. An important indicator of 
environmental impact is the extraction multiplier (the total amount of material which has to 
be moved to extract a tonne of material). For aluminium the EM is 3 tonnes per tonne (t/t); 
for copper it is 450 t/t (Ayres & Ayres 2002, Table A1, p.13).  
 
Assessment of the impacts of resource extraction will be through the extraction multiplier 
(EM), the ratio of the mass of the total material moved to the mass of the end product 
extracted: 
EM  ≥ 1.67 - - - 1.66 ≥ EM ≥ 1.34 - - 1.33 ≥ EM ≥ 1.01 - 
EM = 1.0 = 
0.99 ≥ EM ≥ 0.67 + 0.66 ≥ EM ≥ 34 + + 0.34 ≥ EM + + + 
 
4.4.7 Impacts of landfill 
 
Useful material recovered – (mass of input fuel use in recovery)    
Starting mass of material 
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The two different types of impacts from landfilling waste are the direct social and 
environmental impacts and the loss of void space, which is in some ways equivalent to the 
loss of non-renewable resources. The key environmental impacts from landfill sites are 
leaching, landfill gas (from biodegradable matter as it degrades) and the impact of lorry 
movements. In this study, the non-financial outcome of landfilling is taken to be influenced 
by three factors: the amount of waste to be landfilled; whether the waste arising is 
biodegradable or inert; and whether some part of the waste is classed as hazardous.  
 
The Landfill Impact Factor in the box below takes into account in an additive way the loss to 
society of void space and of landfilled materials (MT), and the environmental impacts of 
biodegradable and hazardous wastes (MB, MH). It may be noted that this equation implies 
that tonne for tonne, the loss of void and resources, biodegradability and whether the waste 
stream is hazardous are weighted equally. This is obviously a fairly crude assumption about 
the relative social disbenefits arising from these different impacts of landfill. It would be 
possible to change this assumption in sensitivity analysis if it seemed likely that landfill 
impacts of a particular kind were of importance in a particular decommissioning scenario. 
 
Landfill impact factor (LIF) = Σ [MT + MB + MH] 
Where: MT = Total mass of waste being landfilled in tonnes; MB = Mass of biodegradable waste being landfilled; 
MH = Mass of hazardous waste being landfilled 
 
The assessment according to the landfill impact factor is as follows: 
EM  ≥ 1.67 - - - 1.66 ≥ EM ≥ 1.34 - - 1.33 ≥ EM ≥ 1.01 - 
100 < LIF < 1000 - 1000 ≤ LIF <5000  - - LIF ≥ 5000 - - - 
 
The total landfill impact of removing the structure and pipelines to shore is relatively small, 
with 2,173 tonnes of material landfilled in all, with a total Landfill Impact Factor (LIF) of 
3,439. For drill cuttings it is a very different story. The nearly 40,000 tonnes of cuttings has 
an LIF of more than 115,000, considerably more than that which the 80,000 tonnes of 
concrete would have if it were to be brought ashore. 
 
4.4.8 Impacts on the fishing industry 
 
The trawling industry in the North Sea would prefer all the materials from the oil and gas 
industry to be removed by decommissioning, leaving a clear seabed. For this assessment, it 
seems important to include two impacts on the trawler fishing industry: the risk of snagging 
and the desire of fishermen for the return of current exclusion zones to fishing use. The 
assessment scheme that has been used is: 
 
• The risk of snagging: 
o For the inconvenience of loss of gear  
(with the potential to be compensated by the industry)  - 
o For the risk to crew - 
• The return of fishing grounds after the removal (or making safe) 
of the structure or cuttings pile (relative to the reference scenario) + 
 
Although it may appear that this assessment is putting equal weighting on the incidence of 
loss of fishing gear and loss of life, this is not the case as by no means would all incidents of 
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loss of fishing gear through snagging lead to the loss of life. Risks are calculated by the 
multiplication of the consequence of a particular risk event occurring by the probability of 
that consequence actually occurring. The probability of the loss of life from a snagging 
incident is very low compared to the probability of loss of fishing gear. 
 
4.4.9 Impacts on fish stocks and other marine life 
 
INSERTED PARA.There is some evidence that at present oil and gas structures act as 
refuges for fish and habitat for cold-water coral. This effect would obviously cease if the 
structure were to be removed and fishing in the area were to be resumed (there is currently a 
500m radius fishing exclusion zone around structures). However, if left in-situ, the footings 
could pose a hazard to trawler fishing, and this would probably prevent extensive trawling 
activities around the in situ footings. In the absence of the footings the cuttings piles are more 
likely to be disturbed by trawler fishing activities. The implications of disturbing the cuttings 
piles would be the potential release of oil-based contamination into the marine environment. 
These issues are assessed in more detail in Ekins et al. 1995. 
 
The benefits to fish stocks from the decommissioning scenarios which leave various 
materials in situ have been assessed as follows: 
 
• Non-trawler area with little enclosed space  +  
• In-situ footings or shallow deposit of topside + + 
• Jacket left in the marine environment + + + 
 
4.5 SUMMARY OF THE ASSESSMENT SCHEME FOR NON-FINANCIAL OUTCOMES 
 
Table 4.3 summarises the various symbols which give the assessments of the material and 
energy flows, and other non-financial outcomes, which have been explained above. It must 
be stressed that in any overall assessment of the scenarios, there can be no addition of the + 
and - signs across the different issues, because they are incommensurable. 
 
 
Table 4.3: Summary of Proposed Assessment Scheme for Non-Financial Outcomes 
 
Non-financial outcome Proposed assessment Assessment score 
Relative energy use (TER) 
and emissions 
 
 
Proportion of energy use and emissions in a scenario (P), compared to the reference scenario 
where: 
P ≥ 167% - - - 
134% ≤ P ≤ 166% - - 
101% ≤P ≤133% - 
P = 100% = 
67% ≤P ≤ 99% + 
34% ≤ P ≤ 66% + + 
P ≤ 33% +++ 
Rate of recovery of 
materials from present 
structure 
 
Rate of recovery (RR) of materials from the structure as currently standing where: 
RR ≥ 85% +++ 
75% ≤ RR ≤ 85% ++ 
51% ≤ RR ≤ 74% + 
RR = 50% = 
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25% ≤ RR ≤49% - 
0.5% ≤ RR ≤ 24% - - 
RR ≤0.5% - - - 
A clear seabed 
Seabed clear of all oil-and-gas related material Clear 
Any oil-and-gas related material is out of site and inaccessible Covered 
Oil-and-gas related material is exposed in the marine environment Not clear 
Health and safety Raising of large structures  - - Divers cutting at depth  - - - 
Jobs in the UK No assessment in the summary outcomes matrices  
Impacts on the marine 
environment 
Additional minor or short-term impacts  - 
Localised disruption of ecosystems or components of them - - 
Significant impacts on ecosystems or components of them - - - 
Conservation of stocks of 
non-renewable resources 
Where RSR is relative loss of non-renewable resources: 
RSR ≥ 67% + + + 
66% ≥ RSR ≥ 34% + + 
33% ≥ RSR ≥ 1% + 
RSR = 0% = 
-1% ≥ RSR ≥ -33% - 
-34% ≥ RSR ≥ -66% - - 
-67% ≥ RSR - - - 
Impacts of resource 
extraction 
Impacts of resource extraction; extraction multiplier (EM) is the ratio of the mass of the total 
material moved to the mass of the end product extracted: 
EM  ≥ 1.67 - - - 
1.66 ≥ EM ≥ 1.34 - - 
1.33 ≥ EM ≥ 1.01 - 
EM = 1.0 = 
0.99 ≥ EM ≥ 0.67 + 
0.66 ≥ EM ≥ 34 + + 
0.34 ≥ EM  + + + 
 
Impact of landfill 
Where Landfill impact factor (LIF) = Σ [MT + MB + MH]: 
100 < LIF < 1000 - 
1000 ≤ LIF <5000  - - 
LIF ≥ 5000 - - - 
Impacts on the fishing 
industry 
Risk of loss of gear  - 
Risk to crew - 
Return of fishing grounds + 
Impacts on fish stocks 
(and other marine life). 
Non-trawler area with little enclosed space  +  
In-situ footings or shallow deposit of topside + + 
Jacket left in the marine environment + + + 
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5 OUTCOMES FROM THE ASSESSMENT 
The Annex (Section 8) summarises the outcomes of the different decommissioning scenarios 
in terms of their material flows, energy flows, financial expenditures and non-financial 
issues. The next section compares these scenarios according to the assessment scheme 
described in Section 4. Table 5.1 gives an overview of this assessment. Were a scenario to be 
adopted by society, then the additional expenditure relative to the reference scenario (the net 
cost in Table 5.1) would give an implicit valuation of the net non-financial benefits yielded 
by that scenario. This is discussed below for each of the decommissioning outcomes. 
 
These results derive from a few case studies (especially Case Study A), and there is little 
other detailed information about North Sea decommissioning in the public domain. However, 
Ekins et al. 2005 shows that there is no reason for thinking that, to a first approximation at 
least, these case studies do not present a reasonable point of departure for the broad 
comparison of outcomes that has been carried out; but interpretation of the results should 
bear the limited evidence base in mind.   
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Table 5.1: Overview of Non-financial Outcomes from Decommissioning Scenarios and Associated Net Expenditures (cost), 
Compared with Reference Scenario 
 
Scenario TER CO2 NOx SO2 Clear 
seabed 
Residual 
financial 
liability 
Health 
& 
safety 
Marine 
impacts 
Stock of 
resources 
Resource 
extraction 
Land
-fill 
Fishing 
industry 
Fish 
stocks1 
Net cost, £m 
(50% UK 
taxpayer) 
T2 - - - - - - - - - Not clear Yes = - - - = - - ++ 18.6 (9.3) 
T3 - - - - - - Clear No = - - +++ +++ - + = 30.4 (15.2) 
J2 - - - - - - - - - Not clear Yes - - - - - = - - = 23.0 (11.5) 
J3 + - - - - - - Clear No - - - - ++ +++ - - + - - - 27.7 (13.8) 
F2a + - - - - - - Not clear Yes - - - - - - +++ +++ - - ++ - - 26.5 (13.3) 
F2b + - - - - - - Clear No - - - - - +++ +++ - - ++ - - 26.5 (13.3) 
T2,J2,F1 - - - - - - Not clear Yes - - - - - - = - - ++ 41.6 (20.8) 
T3,J3,F2 + - - - - - Clear No - - - - - - +++ +++ - - + - - - 84.6 (42.3) 
CON2 - - - - - - - - - - - - Clear No - - - - +++ +++ - - - + - - - 286.7 
(143.4) 
P2 - - - - - - - - - Clear No = - - ++ +++ - ++ = 19.9 (10.0) 
P3 - - - - - - - Not clear Yes = - - - - = ++ = 1.0 (0.5) 
P4 - - - - - - - - - Covered Yes = - - - - = ++ = 25 (12.5) 
C2 - - - - - - - - - - - - Not clear Yes = - - (-) - - (- -)2 = = = 5.1 (2.6) 
C3 - - - - - - - - - - - - Covered Yes = - - +2 = + + 10.3 (5.1) 
C4 - - - - - - - - - - - - Clear No = - - - +2 - - - + + 38.8 (19.4) 
1
 Also includes some other aspects of marine biodiversity 2 Compared with the C1 impact of ‘- -‘ 
Key to Scenarios 
All 1 scenarios are reference scenarios Leave in situ 
T: Topside T2 Removal and shallow disposal; T3 Return and reprocess on shore (applicable to all structures) 
J: Jacket J2 Removal and shallow disposal J3 Return and reprocess on shore (applicable to large steel structures) 
F: Footings F2a Remove with cuttings left in situ F2b Remove with cuttings taken to shore (applicable to large steel structures) 
CON: Mostly concrete structure CON2 Return and reprocess onshore (applicable to concrete structures) 
P: Pipelines P2 Remove and reprocess onshore P3 Leave in situ with remedial action P4 Trench and bury 
C: Drill cuttings C2 Excavate and leave C3 Cover and leave C4 Remove and treat onshore 
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5.1 OVERVIEW OF DECOMMISSIONING ASSESSMENTS AND IMPLICIT VALUATIONS 
5.1.1 Total energy requirement (TER) 
 
Taking account of the energy needed to replace materials left in situ makes a difference. Indeed, it 
is decisive in terms of net energy use for both J3 and F2, which remove the jacket and footings 
respectively to shore and which use less energy than the reference scenario (because of not having 
to replace from virgin sources the metals recovered from offshore). 
 
5.1.2 Air emissions 
 
Air emissions from all the scenarios are worse than in the reference case. This is because offshore 
diesel use is emission-intensive (especially of NOx), so that even those scenarios (J3, F2) which 
use less energy than the reference, produce more emissions. 
 
5.1.3 Clear seabed and resource conservation 
 
There is a clear correlation between the scenarios that produce a clear seabed and those that 
produce positive results in terms of conservation of the stock of non-renewable resources and 
resource extraction. This is not surprising, as much of the material removed to shore is recyclable 
metals. The exception is C4, because the drill cuttings contain very little useful material for 
recycling (the data was not available to the project to assess the possibility of converting the drill 
cuttings into an inert construction material). On the other hand, the scenarios that produce a clear 
seabed also tend to be associated with negative environmental impacts from landfilling, which can 
be considerable (especially CON2 and C4, as evaluated). 
 
5.1.4 Impact on the marine environment 
 
Compared to the reference, and with the exception of the drill cuttings, all the scenarios have a 
negative impact on the marine environment, and with some (F2a, C2) this is pronounced. This is 
because most of the structural material and the pipelines are inert. Leaving it in situ therefore has 
few implications for the marine environment. Removing it to shore, however, involves extensive 
industrial activities offshore that can cause environmental disturbance, though in most cases these 
are only of medium or small scale and are short-lived. The drill cuttings piles are different, 
because of their long-term ecological sterility and slow leakage of contaminants (with the potential 
for faster leakage if disturbed) if left in situ uncovered (C1). Both covering (C3) and removal (C4) 
are assessed as being relatively positive (compared to the reference scenario) for the marine 
environment. Excavation (C2) is worse, and is likely to be unacceptable on environmental grounds 
alone. 
 
5.1.5 UK Employment 
 
No conclusions have been drawn about whether the decommissioning scenarios will provide net 
employment in the UK. This is not because there is any doubt as to whether decommissioning will 
employ people in itself. Obviously any major programme of expenditure will directly generate 
jobs. One issue is that, with an international activity like decommissioning, there is no knowing in 
advance what proportion of these jobs will be in the UK. The other issue is that the net 
employment effect of decommissioning will depend not only on the number jobs it directly 
generates, but the comparison of that number with the number of jobs that would be created by the 
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likely alternative use of decommissioning expenditures (in both the private and public sectors, if 
some decommissioning expenditures represent foregone tax payments), if decommissioning were 
not to be carried out. There is no way of knowing what this alternative use of the money might be, 
nor, in the case of private expenditures, whether they would be spent in the UK. Speculation on 
these matters has been avoided. 
 
5.1.6 Costly scenarios 
 
Easily the most expensive scenario is CON2, the return to shore of a large, mainly concrete 
structure. The resources reclaimed are overwhelmingly concrete and ballast, which are not scarce 
non-renewable resources, although the impacts associated with their extraction can be 
considerable. This provides the first opportunity for an implicit valuation of a decommissioning 
outcome. The net environmental benefits of this scenario are a clear seabed, the reclamation of 
nearly 1mt of materials (920 kt of which were aggregates) and the avoidance of the environmental 
costs of their extraction, net of the extra air emissions, impacts on the marine environment and fish 
stocks, and significant extra landfilling involved. While valuations of these environmental impacts 
may vary between stakeholder groups, it is by no means certain that the net environmental benefits 
are positive. Other non-financial impacts are a small benefit to the fishing industry and a worse 
outcome on health and safety. If society were to choose CON2, it would be equivalent to saying 
that overall it considered these net benefits to be worth £287m in total, and £143m in terms of 
public expenditure. 
 
The next most expensive single scenario is C4, the return of cuttings to shore. This would deliver a 
clear seabed, with the re-establishment of an ecosystem, in place of the largely sterile and 
contaminated drill cuttings pile. There would also be a small benefit to fish stocks in terms of the 
removal of a possible source of toxic contamination. There would also be a benefit to the fishing 
industry in opening up new grounds to trawling (a development which would certainly remove the 
direct benefit of this scenario to fish stocks). The environmental costs of this scenario, compared 
to the reference scenario, are substantial: large scale energy use and air emissions, and maximum 
negative scores in terms of landfill and resource extraction. Some stakeholders may feel that the 
achievement of a clear and regenerating seabed is worth both these environmental impacts and the 
nearly £40m it would cost in the case of this one cuttings pile. Clearing the UKCS of cuttings piles 
would be likely to cost nearer £2bn (detailed calculation in Ekins et al. 2005). Others might feel 
that the seabed gain is outweighed by the other environmental and the financial costs, that the 
money, including the roughly 50% of expenditure that would come from the UK taxpayer, could 
be better spent. 
 
5.1.7 Covering pipelines 
 
The benefits of covering pipelines (P4) go entirely to the fishing industry, there are a number of 
negative environmental impacts and it is relatively expensive. P2 is slightly worse in terms of SO2 
emissions and landfill, but has clear advantages in terms of resource extraction and the stock of 
non-renewable resources, achieves a clear seabed and is 20% cheaper. P2 on this assessment 
therefore seems superior to P4 both environmentally and financially (though it should be 
remembered that the Case Study A structure to which it applies may not be representative of 
pipelines around other structures, which may be smaller in diameter and therefore less costly to 
cover). 
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5.1.8 Decommissioning the structure 
 
A final set of comparisons can be made in respect of the components of the large steel structures, 
between those scenarios which envisage their removal to shore (T3, J3, F2a,b) and those that do 
not (the reference scenarios T1, J1, F1 and the shallow disposal scenarios, T2, J2). The pattern of 
relative benefits between these scenarios is quite clear. Those that involve removal to shore 
achieve a clear seabed, conserve the stock of resources and reduce the resource extraction to 
produce from virgin sources the material that has been recovered. They also benefit the fishing 
industry. For the jacket and footings the removal scenarios  (J3, F2a,b) also conserve energy, 
although they have more emissions, because of the high relative emission intensity of offshore 
diesel use. On the negative side, their health and safety implications, and their impacts on the 
marine environment and in terms of landfill are worse than the in-situ scenarios, which also benefit 
fish (except for T3) rather than the fishing industry.  
 
The removal scenarios are, not surprisingly, more expensive, by £20-30m compared to the 
reference scenarios, but by much less (only £4.7m between J2 and J3) compared with shallow 
disposal. Moreover, all the in-situ scenarios involve some degree of monitoring, which, as noted 
above, is a cost and has a small environmental impact which have not been included in the 
assessment. A financial (though unquantified) benefit of all the clear seabed scenarios, as far as the 
industry is concerned, is that they extinguish any residual financial liability. It may well be that the 
industry would be prepared to pay its share (on average around half) of the cost of the removal 
scenarios in order to be free of any future liability. Whether this consideration counts as much for 
the UK taxpayer, who may prefer to live with the liability while it is not proving problematic, and 
put the taxation revenues to another use, is another matter. 
 
5.1.9 Deciding on Drill Cuttings Piles 
 
As noted earlier, it is only in respect of the drill cuttings piles that the reference scenario (C1) may 
result in a significant negative effect on the marine environment. Excavation (C2) will have an 
even greater negative effect on the marine environment and is not likely to be seriously considered 
on these grounds alone. Both C3 (covering) and removal (C4) have been assessed as having a 
positive effect on the marine environment compared with C1. The major environmental impact 
associated with C3 is the very large quantity of aggregates (166,000t) that is required. This 
produces a large negative impact in terms of resource extraction. It may also be noted that this 
material is not included in the definition of the ‘resource stock ratio’ (RSR, see Section 3.4.5), 
according to which the entry under ‘Stock of resources’ in the summary outcome matrices is 
calculated. Had it been so, then C3 would have scored a ‘- - -‘ in this category as well. The small 
benefit of C3 to fish stocks would, as with C4, be swiftly removed by the fact that it would open 
up the area to the fishing industry. C3 has clear environmental benefits over, for example, C2, 
because the cuttings are covered rather than excavated (blown away). Its marine environmental 
benefits are comparable to that of C4 (removal); it uses less fuel and has no landfill implications, 
but requires far more aggregates; it is also less than a third of the cost of C4. The implicit 
valuations in relation to the drill cuttings scenarios may therefore be summarised as follows: 
C1: this would place a value of less than £10m on the net C3 environmental benefits, and less 
than £39m on the net C4 environmental benefits 
C3: this would imply that the C3 seabed benefits (compared to C1) less the negative impacts of 
the extra fuel use and aggregates extraction were worth at least £10m 
C4: this would imply that the C4 seabed benefits (compared to C1) less the negative impacts of 
the extra fuel use and landfill were worth at least £39m 
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The independent Scientific Review Group (SRG) of the UKOOA JIP advocated a case-by-case 
approach for each drill cuttings pile: “We support the conclusion that the most suitable options are 
removal, covering, and leaving in place to allow natural degradation, and that the balance of 
advantage between these will depend on the specific characteristics and the environment of 
individual cuttings piles.” (SRG 2002, p.4)  
 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ASSESSMENT 
 
There are many differences in preferences, priorities and perceptions related to decommissioning, 
which is one of the reasons why any attempt to give unique money values to the different impacts 
and outcomes is likely to be unsatisfactory, and why there is unlikely to be a full social consensus 
on the ‘best’ decommissioning scenario.  
 
Watson (2004) has expressed the opinion that there are at least seven different kinds of 
consideration which will influence the attitude to decommissioning of different stakeholders: 
technical feasibility, safety, cost, environmental impacts, the regulatory framework, reputation and 
the political environment.  
 
As noted in Section 2, Greenpeace, which is certainly the environmental group that has exerted 
most influence on the UK decommissioning debate and on decommissioning policy tends to stress 
the need to reinforce the international trend against dumping and the need for the industry to take 
responsibility for its products (Greenpeace 2004). It considers that full removal of all materials to 
shore is technically feasible, and that risks to personnel in the activities involved can be mitigated. 
This contrasts with those in the industry who consider that the limited decommissioning 
experience to date has shown that significant technical difficulties remain (Watson 2001, p.28) 
and, of course, dangerous activities remain potentially dangerous whatever risk mitigation 
measures are taken, and accidents happen. In any case, driving risks down to very low levels, in a 
context of considerable technical uncertainty in the first place, is bound to increase costs, perhaps 
very substantially, above the already uncertain estimates that have been quoted here. 
 
These costs will, as noted extensively above, be shared between the industry and the UK taxpayer 
(due to foregone tax revenues). The industry is likely to be concerned about these costs, but this 
will not be the only consideration, and it might well be prepared to pay its (half) share of the costs 
of the removal scenarios, in order to remove any question of future liability, to protect its 
reputation and not to be seen to challenge the current regulatory framework. The Government (and 
taxpayer) may have a different view as to whether this is the best use of public money.  
 
The environmental outcomes from the various decommissioning scenarios are mixed. No scenario 
can be said to be definitively superior from an environmental point of view. The total removal 
scenarios can only be justified environmentally if a relatively high value (though differing for 
different scenarios) is put on a clear seabed, benefits to the fishing industry, the conservation of the 
stock of resources and the impacts of resource extraction (although the last two considerations do 
not apply to drill cuttings), and a relatively low value is put on fish (for all the scenarios), energy 
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use and air emissions (for the concrete structure and drill cuttings), impacts on the marine 
environment (for all the removal scenarios except drill cuttings) and landfill (especially for the 
drill cuttings). It is not clear that this would be the relative valuation accorded to these issues either 
by the range of environmental groups concerned about the marine environment, or by society more 
widely.  It is also not clear what action might be most in line with the precautionary principle, 
which Greenpeace has said needs to be taken into account. Avoiding the negative environmental 
impacts from the removal scenarios may be as important in this regard as achieving a clear seabed 
and recycling metals none of which can be regarded as scarce. 
 
The evidence presented above suggests the following broad conclusions 
 
Topsides, Jackets and Footings of large steel structures 
For the topside, all parties seem agreed that removal to shore (T3) is the only scenario worthy of 
serious consideration, and the assessment shows this to have fewer environmental trade-offs than 
some other removal scenarios. It still involves expenditure of some £30m (£15m from the 
taxpayer) for a single large steel structure, £12m more than the shallow disposal scenario (T2). For 
the jacket, the same arguments seem to apply, except that the difference in cost between the 
removal (J3) and shallow disposal (J2) scenarios is significantly less.  
 
As has been noted, both the reference (T1, J1) and shallow disposal (T2, J2) scenarios are illegal 
under the current DTI regulations deriving from the OSPAR 1998 Decision. This assessment 
shows the implementation of these regulations to be far from cheap, for the industry or the UK 
taxpayer, but, although mixed environmentally, the regulations are at least not obviously counter-
productive, and they implement the desire articulated by Greenpeace (which may well have 
support more widely among the UK and European public) that industry should clean up after itself 
and take responsibility for its products. 
 
The footings are a different matter, largely because of their difficulty of removal, causing both 
environmental impacts and safety concerns, the former of which are complicated by the footings’ 
interaction with drill cuttings. The major impact of leaving them in situ is on the fishing industry. 
 
Large concrete structures 
Unlike the large steel structure, there are strong arguments, environmental and financial, for not 
removing large concrete structures to shore (CON2), and few environmental arguments for doing 
so. The taxpayer expenditure alone on this scenario (£143m) would not seem to be justified by the 
benefits that would result3. 
 
Drill cuttings piles 
The situation with drill cuttings is the most complex of the components of decommissioning 
studied, as has been clearly shown by the assessment and implicit valuation above. Excavation 
(C2) may be rejected on environmental grounds, but both the removal (C4) and covering (C3) 
scenarios also have significant environmental impacts of their own, and require substantial 
expenditures from both the industry and the taxpayer. On the basis of the information and 
technologies currently available, this study suggests that a very high value would have to be put on 
a clear seabed, and a low value on the negative environmental impacts of the alternatives, for the 
                                                 
3
 This was the view also taken by the Norwegian Parliament in 2002, when it approved the ConocoPhillips plan for 
decommissioning Ekofisk, involving the in-situ disposal of the large Ekofisk tank, which was the subject of the 
financial calculations above. The plan also entails the removal of the 14 steel topsides of the Ekofisk complex 
(including that of the tank), and the leaving in situ of the buried pipelines and drill cuttings (ConocoPhillips 2002) 
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preferred scenario not to be leaving the cuttings in place, with a monitoring programme to keep 
their condition and any pollution from them under review.  
 
Pipelines 
For pipelines the situation is similar to that for footings. Recovering them (P2) clears the seabed, 
conserves resources and reduces the impacts of resource extraction, but with some environmental 
impacts, and at a cost of £20m (a figure which Ekins et al. 2005 shows to be specific to Case Study 
A and which therefore may not be representative). The main beneficiaries of this expenditure, as 
with clearing footings, would be the fishing industry. Covering the pipelines (P4) is even more 
expensive and has little environmental justification over removal. Leaving them, with remedial 
action to make them safe for fishing if necessary, would be the preferred scenario, unless a very 
high value was put on a clear seabed and the resources the pipelines comprise. 
 
Monitoring material left in situ 
As noted above, all scenarios with material left in situ would require monitoring, the financial and 
(small) environmental implications of which need to be added to the relevant scenarios. This 
monitoring, and the financial implications of any remedial action which it revealed to be 
necessary, would, in the first instance, be the responsibility of the industry, in view of the ongoing 
liability for materials left in situ which it would retain. It was outside the scope of this project to 
investigate the institutional design of any monitoring programme (for example, who should take 
the decisions about the frequency of monitoring, or what conditions would trigger a requirement 
for remedial work on, perhaps, the drill cuttings piles). However, the very existence of such a 
monitoring programme raises the possibility of this monitoring being combined with marine 
monitoring for other purposes, which in turn broadens the scope of consideration beyond 
decommissioning.  
 
6.2 PUTTING DECOMMISSIONING INTO A WIDER CONTEXT 
Decommissioning is not the only activity in the marine context with environmental implications. 
Indeed, according to OSPAR, the offshore oil and gas industry is not responsible for any of the six 
human pressures on the marine environment to which it gives a Class A (highest impact) grading 
(three of the six pressures come from fishing [removal of target species, seabed disturbance, 
effects of discards and mortality of non-target species], two of them are trace organic contaminants 
from land and shipping, and one is inputs of nutrients from land) (OSPAR 2000, Table 6.1, p.113). 
In this context, any decommissioning scenario that preserves areas from fishing (as the oil and gas 
structures have done) seems likely to have additional environmental benefit (as noted above). Put 
another way, if a seabed clear of drilling materials resulting from decommissioning means that 
trawling again takes place over the area, the seabed will very soon become clear of most marine 
environmental interest as well. 
 
One response to marine environmental degradation, and the loss of fish stocks, has been proposals 
to establish marine protected areas (MPAs, RCEP 2004, Gell & Roberts, forthcoming). OSPAR 
itself is currently engaged in efforts “to complete by 2010 a joint network of well-managed marine 
protected areas that, together with the Natura 2000 network, is ecologically coherent.” (OSPAR 
2003, para.11). MPAs established to conserve or rebuild fish stocks would need to be substantially 
larger than those currently being considered for nature conservation purposes. However, were 
these larger MPA to include the current sites of oil and gas installations, this would remove the 
risk of any drill cuttings piles left in situ being disturbed by trawling operations, with a consequent 
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release of pollution, and would permit any covering of these piles, to enable ecosystem 
regeneration on the seabed, to be far less robust. The present simultaneous concern with both 
decommissioning and MPAs would seem to open up a significant opportunity for marine 
environmental protection that embraces both issues. 
 
One of the factors that militate against MPAs is the expense of monitoring them. Monitoring is 
necessary both to ensure that their status and regulations (e.g. no fishing) are being observed, as 
well as to determine scientifically whether protecting the area is having the desired environmental 
results. It is here that the potential synergies with some decommissioning scenarios exist. 
 
It has been noted above that, in respect of footings, pipelines and drill cuttings at least, the net 
environmental benefit of removing all materials to shore is uncertain, while the cost is very large. 
If these materials were to be left offshore, they would need monitoring. This monitoring would be 
paid for by the industry as part of the decommissioning scenario. If the area to be monitored was 
included in an MPA, it could be a relatively simple task to devise a scheme whereby the 
monitoring also included scientific work and surveillance of MPAs. The potential problem of in-
situ decommissioning scenarios, in relation to interfering with fishing gear, would then also not 
arise, because fishing boats would be excluded from the relevant areas. In time, it might even be 
that the reef effects created by the shallow disposal of structures would, in the context of a MPA, 
make this scenario more publicly acceptable for jackets or topsides, provided that some of the 
monies saved over their removal to shore were also channelled into monitoring or other marine 
environmental protection activity related to the MPA. 
 
It has been noted above that one of the issues relating to in-situ decommissioning scenarios, which 
makes them unattractive to the industry, is that they involve residual financial liability for the 
materials left offshore. It may be that, in addition to making a contribution to monitoring, the 
industry would be prepared to contribute to a marine environmental protection fund, to reduce or 
share this liability with the Government, which would provide even more resources for marine 
environmental protection. There can be little doubt, on the basis of the evidence in the assessment 
above, that using these resources for direct marine environmental protection, especially if this was 
related to MPAs, would yield far more environmental benefit than the removal of thousands of 
tonnes of non-scarce materials to shore. 
 
The serious consideration of such a proposal would require the various parts of OSPAR (those 
relating to decommissioning and MPAs) to start bringing these issues together with a view to 
finding joint solutions to decommissioning and the wider protection of the marine environment. 
Then there is the added difficulty that fishing is outside the remit of OSPAR altogether, and is 
handled in the North Sea area by the European Commission, through the Common Fisheries 
Policy, for EU Member States, and by individual countries otherwise. This introduces great 
institutional complexity into any potential discussions about a strategy that involves conserving 
fish as well as the marine environment. However, it should also be noted that such discussions are 
already taking place in the context of attempts to agree at the EU level a Marine Thematic 
Strategy, which, among other things, is proposing the establishment by 2010 of Eco-Region 
Marine Environmental Protection Plans (European Commission 2004). It would seem highly 
desirable that out of these discussions emerge an effective mechanism to look at such overlapping 
issues as the possible relationship between decommissioning outcomes and MPAs. 
 
The difficulties of establishing such a mechanism should not be underestimated. The reason for 
attempting to overcome them is that utilising resources from the offshore oil and gas industry that 
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were made available for marine environmental protection as part of a package that combined 
decommissioning with MPAs for habitat protection and the regeneration of fish stocks could 
transform the prospects for marine environmental conservation. It is hoped that this paper will 
make a contribution to discussion of these issues. 
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8 ANNEX: SUMMARY OUTCOMES FOR DIFFERENT ELEMENTS IN 
DECOMMISSIONING 
8.1.1  Topside of Large Steel Structure  
 
The reference scenario for the topside (T1) of a large steel structure is to leave it in situ. This 
involves abandoning 20,520 tonnes (t) of materials, of which 20,271t have to be replaced, with an 
energy use of 12,523 toe, with associated emissions of CO2, NOx and SO2 as shown in the table. 
The non-financial outcomes are the reference against which the other scenarios are compared. The 
cost of T1 is taken to be £0, but there is an unquantified residual financial liability to the owners 
for the structure and other materials left in situ. 
 
Scenario T2 (removal and shallow disposal of the topside) leaves the same amount of material 
from the structure in the sea, but requires 3,790t of diesel and 1,188t heavy fuel oil (to provide 
power to run the topside during the decommissioning process), and 1,200t of temporary steel, as 
well as 5,060 toe of energy, to carry it out. The 1,200t temporary steel (which is left in the sea) is 
added to the material which has to be replaced on shore, so more energy is required for recycling. 
The TER has increased by 5,776 toe (46%) over T1, with proportionately higher associated air 
emissions. The seabed is not clear (as it was not in T1), and the outcomes for health and safety, 
marine impacts, conservation and extraction of resources and the fishing industry are all more 
negative than in T1. The landfill outcome is the same, and fish stocks are likely to have benefited 
(because the topside was not previously acting as a reef). The additional expenditure of this 
scenario is £18.6m (£9.3m to UK taxpayer), and the financial liability to the owner for the 
materials and structure left in the sea remains. 
 
Scenario T3 (removal to shore and reprocessing of topside) uses 7,071t (7,279 toe) more diesel 
fuel than T1 and 1,188 tonnes (1,152 toe) more heavy fuel oil, but saves 7,839 toe by recovering, 
rather than having to replace, the material. 244t of material (211t of which is active waste) needs 
to be landfilled in non-hazardous landfill facilities, at a cost of £6,888. There is an additional 5 
tonnes of hazardous waste consisting of such material as LSA (low specific activity) radioactive 
material, PCBs and an estimated 4 tonnes of asbestos which would need to be dealt with by 
specialist contractors and disposal firms. Cost estimates for managing these waste streams are not 
available from Case Study A, and would be difficult to predict with any level of certainty without 
more certain knowledge of how it will be managed, but there is no residual financial liability to the 
owners for any of this landfilled material. The TER includes electricity used in onshore 
dismantling of the topside, which is not included in the material inputs column. Therefore, as 
noted above, the TER in this and the other matrices does not necessarily equal the sum of the 
energy inputs across the row of the matrix. Of the other non-financial outcomes relative to T1, T3 
produces a clear seabed, and clear benefits in terms of the conservation and extraction of 
resources, and to the trawling fishing industry. However, T3 is clearly worse than T1 in respect of 
fish stocks, and seems marginally worse in terms of landfill and impacts on the marine 
environment. The additional expenditure of T3 is £30.4m (£15.2m to UK taxpayer). 
 
8.1.2  Jacket of Large Steel Structure  
 
The reference scenario for the jacket (J1) of a large steel structure is to leave it in situ. This 
involves abandoning 9,500t of steel and aluminium, all of which has to be replaced, with an 
energy use of 7,942 toe, with associated emissions of CO2, NOx and SO2 as shown in the table. 
The non-financial outcomes are the reference against which the other scenarios are compared. The 
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cost of J1 is taken to be £0, but there is an unquantified residual financial liability to the owners for 
the structure and other materials left in situ. 
 
Scenario J2 (removal and shallow disposal of the jacket) leaves the same amount of material from 
the structure in the sea, but requires 3,122t of diesel and temporary steel and 2,600 toe of energy, 
to carry it out. The 600t temporary steel (which is left in the sea) is added to the material which 
has to be replaced on shore, so more energy (358 toe) is required for recycling. The TER has 
increased by 2,958 toe  toe (37%) over J1, with air emissions increased by an even greater 
proportion, because of the relative emission intensity of the diesel. The seabed is not clear (as it 
was not in J1), and the outcomes for health and safety, marine impacts, conservation and 
extraction of resources and the fishing industry are all more negative than in J1. The landfill 
outcome, and that for fish stocks, are the same. The additional expenditure of this scenario is £23m 
(£11.5m to UK taxpayer), and the financial liability to the owner for the materials and structure 
left in the sea remains. 
 
Scenario J3 (removal to shore and reprocessing of the jacket) uses 4,339t more materials and 3,852 
toe more energy than J1 in the removal, but saves 5,699 toe by recovering, rather than having to 
replace, the steel and aluminium. 700t of material (marine growth) needs to be landfilled, at a cost 
of £21,000, but there is no residual financial liability to the owners. The TER of J3 is only 80% 
that of J1, but it produces more air emissions, because the emission intensity of offshore diesel use 
is higher than that of onshore refining. Of the other non-financial outcomes relative to J1, J3 
produces a clear seabed, and clear benefits in terms of the conservation and extraction of 
resources, and to the fishing industry. However, J3 is clearly worse than J1 in respect of health and 
safety, fish stocks, landfill and impacts on the marine environment. The additional expenditure of 
J3 is £27.7m (£13.8m to UK taxpayer). 
 
8.1.3 Footings of Large Steel Structure  
 
The reference scenario for the footings (F1) of a large steel structure is to leave them in situ. This 
involves abandoning 10,300t of steel and aluminium, all of which has to be replaced, with an 
energy use of 7,512 toe, with associated emissions of CO2, NOx and SO2 as shown in the table. It 
may be noted that the replacement of the materials for the footings requires less energy than for 
the jacket (J1), despite the greater quantity of materials involved, because the footings contain less 
energy-intensive aluminium. The non-financial outcomes are the reference against which the other 
scenarios are compared. The cost of F1 is taken to be £0, but there is an unquantified residual 
financial liability to the owners for the footings left in situ. 
 
Scenario F2a (removal of the footings but leaving the drill cuttings in situ, with no distinction 
made between cutting the footings at the level of the cuttings and removing them entirely) requires 
4,201t of diesel and temporary steel and 3,608 toe of energy to recover the materials, but saves 
5,104 toe by recovering, rather than having to replace, the steel and aluminium. 1,000t of material 
(cement grout and marine growth) needs to be landfilled, at a cost of £21,550, but there is no 
residual financial liability (for the footings, though that for drill cuttings will remain) to the 
owners. The TER of F2a is only 85% that of F1, but it produces more air emissions. Of the other 
non-financial outcomes relative to F1, F2a does not produce a clear seabed (because the cuttings 
are left in situ), and is clearly worse than F1 in terms of health and safety, impacts on the marine 
environment, landfill and fish stocks. However, F2a is clearly better than F1 in terms of the 
conservation and extraction of resources, and in respect of the fishing industry. The additional 
expenditure of F2a is £26.5m (£13.3m to UK taxpayer). 
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The material and energy outcomes of Scenario F2b (removal of the footings and the drill cuttings 
to shore) are taken to be the same as F2a, the extra materials and energy required to remove the 
cuttings being assigned to the cuttings decommissioning scenario. A difference between F2b and 
F2a is that in F2b there is no residual financial liability to the owners for either the footings or drill 
cuttings. The TER of F2b is the same as that of F2a. The other non-financial outcomes of F2b are 
similar to F2a, except that now there is a clear seabed (the fate of the cuttings is considered under 
the cuttings decommissioning scenario), and more benefits to the fishing industry. The additional 
expenditure of F2b is the same as that of F2a.  
 
8.1.4  Entire Large Steel Structure  
 
The reference scenario for the entire large steel structure is to leave it in situ, combining the three 
in situ references scenarios for the individual components of the structure (T1, J1, F1). This 
involves abandoning over 40,000t of metals, all of which has to be replaced, with an energy use of 
27,976 toe, with associated emissions of CO2, NOx and SO2 as shown in the table. The non-
financial outcomes are the reference against which the other scenarios are compared. The cost of 
this reference scenario for the whole structure is taken to be £0, but there is an unquantified 
residual financial liability to the owners for the structure (and any other materials left in situ). 
 
The next whole-structure scenario to be considered is the removal and shallow disposal of the 
topside and jacket (T2, J2), while leaving the footings in situ (F1). This leaves the same amount of 
material from the structure in the sea, but requires 9,300t of diesel and temporary steel and 7,760 
toe of energy, to carry it out. The 1,800t temporary steel (which is left in the sea) is added to the 
material which has to be replaced on shore, so more energy is required for recycling. The TER has 
increased by 8,734 toe (31%) over the whole-structure reference scenario, with proportionately 
higher associated air emissions. The seabed is not clear (as it was not in the reference scenario), 
and all the other non-financial outcomes are worse than in the reference scenario, except for 
landfill, which is the same, and fish stocks, which benefit from the reef effects of the shallow 
disposal. The additional expenditure of this scenario is £41.6m (£20.8m to UK taxpayer), and the 
financial liability to the owner for the materials and structure left in the sea remains. 
 
Removal of the whole structure to shore for reprocessing (T3, J3, F2a,b) uses 17,998t more 
materials and 15,896 toe more energy than the whole-structure reference scenario (TI, J1, F1), but 
saves 18,642 toe by recovering, rather than having to replace, the metals. 1,949t of material (the 
sum of that from T3, J3, F2a,b) needs to be landfilled, at a cost of £49,348, but there is no residual 
financial liability to the owners. The TER of this scenario is only 94% that of the whole-structure 
reference scenario, but it produces more air emissions. Of the other non-financial outcomes 
relative to this reference, this scenario produces a clear seabed, and clear benefits in terms of the 
conservation and extraction of resources. It is also positive for the fishing industry. However, the 
scenario is clearly worse than the reference in respect of health and safety, fish stocks, landfill and 
impacts on the marine environment. The additional expenditure of the scenario is £84.6m (£42.3m 
to UK taxpayer). 
 
8.1.5 Mostly Concrete Structure 
 
The reference scenario (CON1) for the mostly concrete structure is to leave it in situ. This involves 
abandoning over 1mt of materials, 46,134t of which are metals, while the rest is ballast and 
concrete. Most of this has to be replaced onshore, with an energy use of 30,649 toe, with 
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associated emissions of CO2, NOx and SO2 as shown in the table. The non-financial outcomes are 
the reference against which the other scenarios are compared. The cost of this reference scenario 
for the whole structure is taken to be £0, but there is an unquantified residual financial liability to 
the owners for the structure (and other materials left in situ). 
 
The scenario CON2 entails removing the structure to shore for reprocessing. This uses 61,204t 
(63,005 toe) more diesel fuel than CON1, but saves 20,718 toe by recovering, rather than having to 
replace, the materials. 83,700t of material (80,000t of which is concrete, the rest being marine 
growth) needs to be landfilled, at a cost of £1.47m, but there is no residual financial liability to the 
owners. The TER of CON2 is 189% more than that of CON1, and air emissions are also much 
greater (though less than proportionately), due to the high energy requirement of recovering the 
materials. Of the other non-financial outcomes relative to this reference, CON2 produces a clear 
seabed, and clear benefits in terms of the conservation and extraction of resources. It is also 
positive for the fishing industry. However, the scenario is clearly worse than CON1 in respect of 
health and safety, fish stocks, landfill and impacts on the marine environment. The additional 
expenditure of the scenario is £286.7m (£143.4m to UK taxpayer). 
 
8.1.6 Pipelines 
 
The reference scenario for pipelines (P1) is to leave them in situ with no remedial action. This 
involves abandoning 5,351t of materials, 5,127t of which have to be replaced onshore, with an 
energy use of 2,386 toe, with associated emissions of CO2, NOx and SO2 as shown in the table. 
The non-financial outcomes are the reference against which the other scenarios are compared. The 
cost of this reference scenario for the whole structure is taken to be £0, but there is an unquantified 
residual financial liability to the owners for the materials left in situ. 
 
The scenario P2 entails removing the pipelines to shore for reprocessing. This uses 2,046t (2,107 
toe) more diesel fuel than P1, but saves 1,578 toe by recovering, rather than having to replace, the 
materials. 224t of concrete needs to be landfilled, at a cost of £3,808, but there is no residual 
financial liability to the owners. The TER of P2 is 28% more than that of P1, but air emissions, 
especially of NOx, are proportionately much higher than this, because of the NOx intensity of 
burning the diesel.  Of the other non-financial outcomes relative to P1, P2 produces a clear seabed, 
and clear benefits in terms of the conservation and extraction of resources. It is also positive for 
the fishing industry, and no worse than P1 for health and safety and fish stocks. There is a small 
negative outcome in respect of landfill and impacts on the marine environment. The additional 
expenditure of the scenario is £19.9m (£10m to UK taxpayer). 
 
The scenario P3 entails leaving the pipelines in situ with remedial action. This uses only 259t (267 
toe) more diesel fuel than P1, but leaves the same amount of material in the sea, and the same 
amount to be replaced, and leaves residual financial liability for owners. The TER of P3 is 11% 
more than that of P1, but extra NOx are again proportionately much higher than this (though less 
than in P2). Of the other non-financial outcomes relative to P1, P3 is only an improvement in 
respect of the fishing industry, is the same in respect of health and safety, fish stocks and landfill, 
and is worse in respect of natural resources and the marine environment. The additional 
expenditure of P3 is £1m (£½m to UK taxpayer). 
 
The scenario P4 entails trenching and burying the pipelines. It is very similar to P3, leaves the 
same amount of material in the sea, and the same amount to be replaced, although the pipelines are 
now covered, and leaves residual financial liability for owners. It uses 920t (947 toe) more diesel 
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fuel than P1. Its TER is 40% more than that of P1, with higher emissions, with extra NOx again 
proportionately much more increased. Air emissions are also greater than P3, though less than P2. 
The other non-financial outcomes are the same as for P3. The additional expenditure of P4 is 
£25m (£12.5m to UK taxpayer). 
 
8.1.7 Drill Cuttings  
 
The reference scenario for drill cuttings (C1) is to leave them in situ with no covering. This 
involves abandoning 40,000t of materials, but the great majority of these are waste materials, and 
only 1,413t of recoverable waste oil (contained in the cuttings) have to be replaced onshore. There 
is no energy use or air emissions in C1. The non-financial outcomes are the reference against 
which the other scenarios are compared. This is the only reference scenario which is given a 
negative impact on the marine environment (‘- -‘), because of the long-term ecological sterility of 
the cuttings pile and the continuous low-level leaching of contaminants from it.The cost of this 
reference scenario for the whole structure is taken to be £0, but there is an unquantified residual 
financial liability to the owners for the materials left in situ. 
 
The scenario C2 entails excavating and leaving the cuttings. This uses only 772t (794 toe) more 
diesel fuel than P1, but leaves the same amount of material in the sea, and leaves residual financial 
liability for owners. The TER and air emissions of C2 are obviously higher than the zero in this 
category of C1. Of the other non-financial outcomes relative to C1, C2 is the same in respect of 
health and safety, landfill, the fishing industry and fish stocks, but worse in respect of natural 
resources and the marine environment. The additional expenditure of C2 is £5.1m (£2.6m to UK 
taxpayer). 
 
The scenario C3 entails covering and leaving the cuttings (with or without the base of the footings 
left in place). This uses 4,004t (4,122 toe) more diesel fuel than C1, and about 166,000t of sand 
and gravel. The same amount of material is left in the sea, and the same amount has to be replaced 
as in C1, although the cuttings are now covered, perhaps reducing the financial liability for 
owners. C3 produces far more air emissions than the zero emissions of C1, but also nearly six 
times the CO2, and higher other air emissions, than C2. Of the other non-financial outcomes 
relative to C1, C3 is the same in respect of health and safety and landfill, better in respect of the 
fishing industry, fish stocks and the marine environment, but worse in respect of natural resources, 
with especially high resource extraction impacts because of the amount of sand and gravel used. 
The additional expenditure of C3 is £10.3m (£5.1m to UK taxpayer). 
 
The scenario C4 entails removing the cuttings to shore for reprocessing. This uses 9,073t (9,340 
toe) more diesel fuel than C1, which is partially offset by the 1,413t (1,370 toe) of recovered oil. 
38,587t of material needs to be landfilled, at a cost of £655,984, but there is no residual financial 
liability to the owners. The TER of C4 is 8,036 toe more than that of C1, with correspondingly 
high air emissions. Energy use is nearly twice, and air emissions are more than twice, those of C3. 
Of the other non-financial outcomes relative to C1, C4 produces a clear seabed, and benefits in 
respect of the fishing industry, fish stocks and the marine environment. It is the same for health 
and safety. However, it is very much worse than C1 in terms of landfill (assuming the cuttings 
cannot be processed into an inert construction material), and also negative in terms of resource 
extraction,  and resource conservation (because of the extra diesel use). The additional expenditure 
of the scenario is £38.9m (£19.4m to UK taxpayer).  
 
 
